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Of Plants and People: Why Do We Care About Dignity? 
 
Shawn H. E. Harmon 
 
References to (human) dignity are littered throughout statements of modern human rights and 
bioethics instruments, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (1950), to UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights (2005), to the latest version of the Declaration of Helsinki 
(2008). Dignity is both the background value of, and the primary principle upon which, these 
texts are constructed.  
 
Despite this ubiquitous reliance on dignity, it remains a notoriously slippery concept; it can 
be both a positive and empowering value, or a negative and constraining one (Harmon, 
2006). In this context, I would define ‘values’ as deeply held ideas or moral concepts about 
what is good and right—which are constitutive of the self—and what supports human 
flourishing and contributes both to personal and social identity—which are tenets of justice. 
In both cases, values are complex, overlapping and opaque, and therefore often hidden. I 
define ‘principles’ in much the same way, but with the subtle difference that ‘values’ are 
more social, idealistic and of a higher order than principles, which are more legally grounded 
and instrumental.  
 
Ultimately, the value of dignity is in the eye of the beholder; it depends upon their 
interpretation and socio-political objective. In short, although dignity is intuitively 
comprehensible and universally appealing—no one wants to be said to act against dignity—it 
is also confounding and contentious, and, as such, its utility as an action-guiding tool has 
been questioned (Macklin, 2003; Harmon, 2005). 
 
Despite the fact that dignity is a rather opaque concept, it persists as a pillar in the legal 
realm. The first article of the German constitution, for example, states that, “Human dignity 
shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority”; similarly, 
Article 7 of the Swiss constitution says, “Human dignity is to be respected and protected”. 
Legislators, both international and national, continue to rely on dignity in governing 
instruments in the biotech and other fields, and thereby impose on stakeholders the necessity 
of demonstrating compliance, at least notionally, with dignity in the pursuit of their work. 
The Swiss have gone farther than most in this regard. Over a decade ago, the Swiss 
Constitution was amended to include a provision that stipulates that account must be taken of 
the dignity of creation when handling animals, plants and other organisms. This led to the 
Gene Technology Act 2004 in Switzerland, which states that the dignity of creatures—
animals, plants and other life forms—should be considered in any research. 
 
The Act allows—indeed encourages—rules and regulations to be based on dignity for both 
humans and non-human species. This state of affairs prompted the Swiss Ethics Committee 
on Non-Human Biotechnology (ECNH) to conclude, by a majority, that living organisms, 
including plants, have their own inherent worth, and, as such, should not be used frivolously 
or “simply as we please” (ECNH, 2008). One consequence is that researchers in Switzerland 
must now include a paragraph in their funding applications that addresses how they consider 
plant or animal dignity in formulating their protocols. Not surprisingly, nobody really knows 
what plant dignity is, and the law has been accused of unreasonableness and incompatibility 
with any form of basic research insofar as it imposes on researchers the need to identify 
immediate benefits from any research project that uses plants or animals (Abbott, 2008; 
Haines, 2008).  
 
The difficulty of complying with the law and the uncertainty surrounding its requirements 
can be seen in an ongoing case that concerns neuroinformatics research using rhesus 
monkeys—approved by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Zurich Veterinary 
Office in 2006.  The Swiss Advisory Committee on Animal Experimentation appealed 
against the issuance of research licenses and, in 2007, the local court upheld the appeal, 
banning both experiments, in part on the basis of the monkeys’ dignity. The University of 
Zurich and the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich appealed that decision to the 
canton’s administrative court, but in 2008 their appeal was refused. 
 
Like many other observers of the social and legal aspects of the biosciences (Sandberg, 2008; 
Smith, 2008), I thought that both this law and its fallout was faintly ridiculous, and probably 
another example of a law with good intentions applied in ways in which it was never 
intended. Reports that debates had arisen over the indignity visited upon wild flowers by their 
“decapitation” fortified that reaction (Abbott, 2008). Given that we raze forests to raise 
livestock, and plough pastures to plant bio-fuels for gas-guzzling SUVs, I thought it 
unseemly, even absurd, to seriously debate the “dignity” of the plants that are being used in 
the laboratory (Abbott, 2008). First, as noted above, dignity is an amorphous concept that is 
used to support almost any position one might wish to take on almost any issue in medical 
research or social analysis; most often it is intended to enhance the individual’s integrity and 
the respect accorded to them, but it is variously interpreted, selectively applied, and unevenly 
enjoyed. If dignity is so important, why do we ignore it and quite often actively circumvent it 
even when we are dealing with fellow humans? Leaving aside widely supported actions of 
government that are specifically designed to diminish dignity, such as jail terms for convicted 
criminals or physically abusive interrogations of suspects, let us consider the following 
characteristics of the modern world from a health perspective. 
 
Many people die from neglect, or from easily preventable diseases without receiving any 
treatment. The divide between developed and developing countries is still widening, with 
immense implications for healthcare and the realization of wellbeing. We spend billions of 
dollars and euros on research that does not address the diseases from which the majority of 
people on this planet suffer, or that cannot possibly lead to treatments that would be 
accessible to the majority of the world’s population in the short, medium, or probably even 
long term. We persistently degrade the environment in pursuit of commercial interests, 
though it is well understood that human—and animal and plant—wellbeing is dependent on 
environmental health. In short, very little is done to avoid circumstances in which people or 
other species languish in the most base of undignified states. 
 
It is obvious, then, that despite our rhetorical attachment to dignity in the human rights and 
bioethics paradigms, as a global community we are unable to even agree collective or 
prescribed responsibility for protecting human dignity, let alone that of other species. Is it the 
United Nations, the leaders of the richest countries, health ministries, environmental 
ministries, armed forces or individual citizens who are most responsible for the dignity of 
others? More often than not, these entities, particularly the latter two, facilitate indignity and 
inhumanity. Individuals, for example, particularly those in the West, enjoy massive benefits 
and bear very few duties, hardly ever taking seriously a duty to actively promote and enhance 
the dignity of others or the environment. For evidence of this, we might consider our 
sporadic, selective, and largely ineffectual attempts at aiding those suffering due to persistent 
food or medical shortages, or social upheaval, and our continued destruction of wilderness 
and habitats. 
 
If we accept that dignity is an inherent good—and I believe we do—and if we could agree on 
what it should be—and I believe we could find a minimum consensus—and if we truly cared 
for all living beings on this planet, including plants, would we not do things very differently? 
Would we not mobilise all societies and their resources toward improving everyone’s 
wellbeing and actually achieving some modicum of dignity? Would not all individuals be 
required to support and contribute to publicly funded research with the aim of finding cures 
for both rare and widely experienced diseases and conditions? But we neither require this of 
the individual, nor do we demand such heroic efforts from our public bodies. We cannot even 
tolerate the idea of acting this way because of the ‘unthinkable’ social and financial upheaval 
it would necessitate. Is this because dignity is merely the empty rhetorical tool of a liberal 
ideology gone too far that has conducted a centuries-long campaign against 
communitarianism? Is it because it is just too difficult to achieve this goal through the 
institutions with which we have become comfortable? Is it because the formulations and 
interpretations of dignity that have come to the fore are more about individual autonomy than 
about the community and the environment? 
 
These questions not only highlight the difficulty associated with improving the human lot, but 
also the difficulty of hoping to do so based on an approach that relies on dignity; we cannot 
even agree on what dignity demands of us or for us. And now we are demanding that 
researchers wrestle with the dignity of plants. I am not in principle against critical 
consideration of such esoteric issues—as higher conscious beings, indeed the beings with the 
highest consciousness we have yet recognised, it rightfully falls to us to do so—but to do so 
at the expense of more serious ethical concerns is, I reasoned, a comedy—perhaps a 
tragedy—worthy of Shakespeare’s quill. 
 
But, of course, I could be completely wrong. Perhaps mandating serious consideration of 
dignity, not only of humans, but also of animals and plants, even in the absence of a global 
consensus, is a first and crucial step in truly realising this value, which resonates with so 
many people and societies. Maybe it will force researchers to become more engaged with 
issues beyond the scientific questions with which they commonly wrestle. Maybe it will force 
all of us to arrive at some better understanding of what dignity could mean. It has been 
argued that our senses and cognitive limitations hinder our ability to respond rationally to the 
catastrophic environmental threats we are already facing at the beginning of this century, 
threats that are largely of our own making (Hanski, 2008; Vince, 2009). Maybe a mandated 
duty to seriously and explicitly consider the dignity of humans, animals, plants, and 
ultimately the environment, is a critical step toward adopting a broader view that is capable of 
better comprehending and turning positive our enormous impact on the earth and its other 
species, and therefore improving our own future prospects. Maybe it is to be applauded. 
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